Communities in northern Nigeria are facing a growing nutrition crisis, as health workers report an increase in child malnutrition linked to worsening food insecurity. The country's economic hardship, compounded by global shocks and rising food prices associated with the conflict in the Middle East, is leaving many families unable to afford adequate meals.
Wednesday, July 22, 2026
Video - Rising food insecurity is pushing more children into malnutrition in northern Nigeria
Communities in northern Nigeria are facing a growing nutrition crisis, as health workers report an increase in child malnutrition linked to worsening food insecurity. The country's economic hardship, compounded by global shocks and rising food prices associated with the conflict in the Middle East, is leaving many families unable to afford adequate meals.
Nigeria arrested suspected terrorists returning from Hajj. But several questions are unanswered
The atmosphere inside the international arrivals terminal at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport in Katsina was one of celebration. Families stood behind security barriers waiting to embrace relatives returning from Saudi Arabia after completing the 2026 Hajj pilgrimage. Airport officials moved methodically through familiar administrative routines, and returning pilgrims wheeled their luggage toward the main arrival hall after presenting their travel documents for standard border clearance.
Then, without warning to the waiting crowd, the routine changed.
As passengers stepped forward one after another for immigration clearance, border control officers quietly isolated seven men from the rest of the arriving passengers. There was no public commotion, no shouting, and no dramatic confrontation inside the terminal. The men were discreetly separated from the other pilgrims, escorted out of public view under heavy security detail, and placed in immediate custody.
Within hours, the seven detainees were moved out of the airport under armed escort and subsequently flown to Abuja, where they were handed over to the State Security Service (SSS).
Days later, the Minister of Interior, Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo, made a public announcement that transformed the quiet airport operation into a subject of intense national debate. The minister stated that security agencies had intercepted seven suspected commanders of Boko Haram and ISWAP who had returned from the Hajj through the Katsina airport.
Nigeria faces several types of terrorism from groups like ISWAP, Boko Haram, and bandits. Several groups of bandits operate in Katsina, where thousands of people have been killed or kidnapped in recent years.
The government presented the arrests as evidence of Nigeria’s expanding digital border management capabilities, highlighting technical advancements in biometric identity verification and real-time intelligence coordination among security agencies.
As of the time of publishing this story, neither the federal government nor the SSS has publicly released the identities of the seven suspects or announced any criminal charges against them.
While the minister’s announcement generated major headlines across the country, it also left behind a series of fundamental questions. The most critical question raised by the operation is not how the men were apprehended upon their return, but how they managed to leave Nigeria in the first place.
Unlike some transnational criminals who utilise forged travel documents, stolen identities, or clandestine border crossings, immigration officials familiar with the operation confirmed to PREMIUM TIMES that the seven suspects travelled using valid Nigerian international passports issued in their own legal names and identities.
The seven men completed all official Hajj travel procedures before leaving Nigeria. This paradox raises difficult accountability questions extending far beyond the immediate fate of the seven suspects: What specific security screening protocols exist before an intending pilgrim is cleared to leave Nigeria? Which institutions bear the statutory responsibility for identifying registration applicants who are already on national security watchlists? Did the intelligence identifying these suspects emerge only while they were overseas, or were crucial opportunities to intercept them missed before they boarded their outbound flight? Most fundamentally, where does administrative accountability reside among the overlapping state and federal institutions that coordinate one of Nigeria’s largest annual international migrations?
Over several days of field reporting, PREMIUM TIMES interviewed security personnel familiar with the airport operation, spoke with anonymous policy and intelligence sources, questioned civil society leaders, and visited the headquarters of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board. PREMIUM TIMES also reviewed official government statements, examined the administrative mechanics of the annual Hajj workflow, and sought clarifications from every primary institution involved.
What emerged was a fragmented institutional picture. Federal authorities describe the operation as a successful intelligence-led border interdiction enabled by integrated digital systems, while civil society groups argue it exposed weaknesses in pre-departure vetting. Several of the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims either declined to explain their screening procedures or failed to answer key questions.
Rather than determining the guilt or innocence of the suspects, this investigation examines how those institutional responsibilities intersect and where accountability for pre-departure screening ultimately lies.
Then, without warning to the waiting crowd, the routine changed.
As passengers stepped forward one after another for immigration clearance, border control officers quietly isolated seven men from the rest of the arriving passengers. There was no public commotion, no shouting, and no dramatic confrontation inside the terminal. The men were discreetly separated from the other pilgrims, escorted out of public view under heavy security detail, and placed in immediate custody.
Within hours, the seven detainees were moved out of the airport under armed escort and subsequently flown to Abuja, where they were handed over to the State Security Service (SSS).
Days later, the Minister of Interior, Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo, made a public announcement that transformed the quiet airport operation into a subject of intense national debate. The minister stated that security agencies had intercepted seven suspected commanders of Boko Haram and ISWAP who had returned from the Hajj through the Katsina airport.
Nigeria faces several types of terrorism from groups like ISWAP, Boko Haram, and bandits. Several groups of bandits operate in Katsina, where thousands of people have been killed or kidnapped in recent years.
The government presented the arrests as evidence of Nigeria’s expanding digital border management capabilities, highlighting technical advancements in biometric identity verification and real-time intelligence coordination among security agencies.
As of the time of publishing this story, neither the federal government nor the SSS has publicly released the identities of the seven suspects or announced any criminal charges against them.
While the minister’s announcement generated major headlines across the country, it also left behind a series of fundamental questions. The most critical question raised by the operation is not how the men were apprehended upon their return, but how they managed to leave Nigeria in the first place.
Unlike some transnational criminals who utilise forged travel documents, stolen identities, or clandestine border crossings, immigration officials familiar with the operation confirmed to PREMIUM TIMES that the seven suspects travelled using valid Nigerian international passports issued in their own legal names and identities.
The seven men completed all official Hajj travel procedures before leaving Nigeria. This paradox raises difficult accountability questions extending far beyond the immediate fate of the seven suspects: What specific security screening protocols exist before an intending pilgrim is cleared to leave Nigeria? Which institutions bear the statutory responsibility for identifying registration applicants who are already on national security watchlists? Did the intelligence identifying these suspects emerge only while they were overseas, or were crucial opportunities to intercept them missed before they boarded their outbound flight? Most fundamentally, where does administrative accountability reside among the overlapping state and federal institutions that coordinate one of Nigeria’s largest annual international migrations?
Over several days of field reporting, PREMIUM TIMES interviewed security personnel familiar with the airport operation, spoke with anonymous policy and intelligence sources, questioned civil society leaders, and visited the headquarters of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board. PREMIUM TIMES also reviewed official government statements, examined the administrative mechanics of the annual Hajj workflow, and sought clarifications from every primary institution involved.
What emerged was a fragmented institutional picture. Federal authorities describe the operation as a successful intelligence-led border interdiction enabled by integrated digital systems, while civil society groups argue it exposed weaknesses in pre-departure vetting. Several of the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims either declined to explain their screening procedures or failed to answer key questions.
Rather than determining the guilt or innocence of the suspects, this investigation examines how those institutional responsibilities intersect and where accountability for pre-departure screening ultimately lies.
How the Hajj Vetting and Registration System Works
To evaluate how the seven suspects departed the country, it is first necessary to reconstruct the structured administrative process that an ordinary citizen must follow to perform the annual pilgrimage under Nigeria’s official framework.
Travelling for Hajj is not a simple commercial transaction; for the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims, it is a months-long, highly regulated bureaucratic process involving shared responsibilities among state governments, federal agencies, and Saudi Arabian authorities.
The operational chain begins at the grassroots level under the direct control of state agencies, such as the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, where designated Hajj officials receive applications and guide prospective pilgrims through the registration process. Following seasonal consultations with Saudi Arabian authorities, the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) sets and announces the official annual Hajj fare, which covers airfare, accommodation in Mecca and Medina, meals, local transport, and associated logistics.
Prospective pilgrims must deposit this approved fare, which has risen sharply in recent years to between seven and eight million Naira due to macroeconomic inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, directly into the state board’s designated bank accounts.
Once financial obligations are satisfied, the applicant proceeds to the documentation stage. Interviews with Hajj stakeholders and border control officials indicate that the international passport has become the centralised identity document underpinning the entire modern registration workflow. Unlike in previous decades, when multiple separate supporting identity documents and physical clearance forms were collected manually by local boards, the vast majority of an applicant’s personal information, including biometric data and National Identification Numbers (NIN), is now embedded directly within the passport itself following enrollment by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).
Once local documentation closes, the state pilgrims welfare board compiles the names of qualified applicants from across its local government areas into a comprehensive statewide register. This unified list is transmitted to NAHCON headquarters in Abuja for national coordination.
NAHCON subsequently uploads the pilgrims’ data into Saudi Arabia’s electronic Hajj portal, through which the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah issues the mandatory entry visas electronically. Only after the electronic visas are approved are the pilgrims assigned to outbound flights, and final passenger manifests are generated for each state delegation, indicating exactly who is cleared to board each charter aircraft.
According to immigration officials who spoke to PREMIUM TIMES anonymously, the NIS’s statutory responsibilities change significantly as the process moves from passport issuance to airport departure clearance. It was learned that the primary daily mandate of officers stationed at the international departure terminals is to enforce immigration laws governing valid exit and entry, establish identity, and verify the physical integrity of travel documents.
Therefore, according to the officers interviewed, immigration officers primarily verify identity and travel documents and rely on intelligence alerts or watchlists supplied through the wider national security system when determining whether a traveller should be intercepted.
An immigration officer stationed in the region explained that their core role at the departure gate is passenger clearance. The source stated that when a traveller presents a passport, biometric verification and document checks are conducted to confirm that the passport is genuine and that the bearer standing before the officer is the legitimate holder of the document.
The official emphasised that routine immigration clearance remains an identity check, whereas the specialised tracking of terrorism suspects or the management of active criminal intelligence falls within the distinct purview of specialised intelligence agencies.
Federal pilgrimage authorities further clarify this division of responsibilities. Contacted by PREMIUM TIMES regarding the boundaries of federal oversight, NAHCON spokesperson Fatima Usara clarified that NAHCON is not statutorily positioned to conduct background checks or profile individual travellers.
Mrs Usara stated that NAHCON does not conduct screening operations, clarifying that such mandates fall squarely on individual state units. According to her, state pilgrims’ welfare boards function as direct operators, handling grouping and overseeing pilgrim manifests, while NAHCON acts strictly as a manager and regulator, tasked with establishing administrative standards, issuing policy statements, and monitoring implementation.
Regarding national security protocols, Mrs Usara added that while NAHCON maintains security agencies as affiliates to assist the matrix, the primary curation of manifests remains decentralised at the state operational level.
This dynamic exposes a critical operational divide. While border immigration personnel at the airport verify identity at the point of international travel and federal regulators monitor compliance with standards, the active vetting of individual backgrounds rests with the state-level frameworks that initially compile the lists. Many states, however, lack the capacity for such vetting, as Nigeria currently operates a unitary security system in which virtually all security agencies are owned and controlled by the federal government.
To understand how the seven suspects passed through these early administrative stages, PREMIUM TIMES visited the Katsina headquarters of the State Pilgrims Welfare Board to obtain an official explanation of the administrative safeguards and background checks built into the pilgrim recruitment process. The board declined to provide details of the process.
During the visit, the Executive Director of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, Yunusa Dankama, declined to discuss the registration workflow or to explain what protocols exist for cross-referencing applicant lists with national security watchlists.
The official maintained that details regarding the processing of the state’s Hajj delegation are classified information that cannot be disclosed to the public or the press, asserting that such operational transparency is reserved solely for registered, intending pilgrims. He said that the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board is strictly a logistical and administrative body, not a security agency.
This refusal to disclose the screening workflow leaves a gap in the public’s understanding of the administrative processes. While border security personnel at the airport mapped out their point-of-exit responsibilities, the state institution responsible for processing the applicants, compiling the delegation register, and authorising the final flight manifests declined to explain how its screening safeguards operate before pilgrims reach the tarmac.
One question investigators may still need to answer is whether any local documentation, including letters or clearances issued under regional community peace and amnesty initiatives, formed part of the application process for persons later described by federal authorities as security suspects.
To evaluate how the seven suspects departed the country, it is first necessary to reconstruct the structured administrative process that an ordinary citizen must follow to perform the annual pilgrimage under Nigeria’s official framework.
Travelling for Hajj is not a simple commercial transaction; for the vast majority of Nigerian Muslims, it is a months-long, highly regulated bureaucratic process involving shared responsibilities among state governments, federal agencies, and Saudi Arabian authorities.
The operational chain begins at the grassroots level under the direct control of state agencies, such as the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, where designated Hajj officials receive applications and guide prospective pilgrims through the registration process. Following seasonal consultations with Saudi Arabian authorities, the National Hajj Commission of Nigeria (NAHCON) sets and announces the official annual Hajj fare, which covers airfare, accommodation in Mecca and Medina, meals, local transport, and associated logistics.
Prospective pilgrims must deposit this approved fare, which has risen sharply in recent years to between seven and eight million Naira due to macroeconomic inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, directly into the state board’s designated bank accounts.
Once financial obligations are satisfied, the applicant proceeds to the documentation stage. Interviews with Hajj stakeholders and border control officials indicate that the international passport has become the centralised identity document underpinning the entire modern registration workflow. Unlike in previous decades, when multiple separate supporting identity documents and physical clearance forms were collected manually by local boards, the vast majority of an applicant’s personal information, including biometric data and National Identification Numbers (NIN), is now embedded directly within the passport itself following enrollment by the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS).
Once local documentation closes, the state pilgrims welfare board compiles the names of qualified applicants from across its local government areas into a comprehensive statewide register. This unified list is transmitted to NAHCON headquarters in Abuja for national coordination.
NAHCON subsequently uploads the pilgrims’ data into Saudi Arabia’s electronic Hajj portal, through which the Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Umrah issues the mandatory entry visas electronically. Only after the electronic visas are approved are the pilgrims assigned to outbound flights, and final passenger manifests are generated for each state delegation, indicating exactly who is cleared to board each charter aircraft.
According to immigration officials who spoke to PREMIUM TIMES anonymously, the NIS’s statutory responsibilities change significantly as the process moves from passport issuance to airport departure clearance. It was learned that the primary daily mandate of officers stationed at the international departure terminals is to enforce immigration laws governing valid exit and entry, establish identity, and verify the physical integrity of travel documents.
Therefore, according to the officers interviewed, immigration officers primarily verify identity and travel documents and rely on intelligence alerts or watchlists supplied through the wider national security system when determining whether a traveller should be intercepted.
An immigration officer stationed in the region explained that their core role at the departure gate is passenger clearance. The source stated that when a traveller presents a passport, biometric verification and document checks are conducted to confirm that the passport is genuine and that the bearer standing before the officer is the legitimate holder of the document.
The official emphasised that routine immigration clearance remains an identity check, whereas the specialised tracking of terrorism suspects or the management of active criminal intelligence falls within the distinct purview of specialised intelligence agencies.
Federal pilgrimage authorities further clarify this division of responsibilities. Contacted by PREMIUM TIMES regarding the boundaries of federal oversight, NAHCON spokesperson Fatima Usara clarified that NAHCON is not statutorily positioned to conduct background checks or profile individual travellers.
Mrs Usara stated that NAHCON does not conduct screening operations, clarifying that such mandates fall squarely on individual state units. According to her, state pilgrims’ welfare boards function as direct operators, handling grouping and overseeing pilgrim manifests, while NAHCON acts strictly as a manager and regulator, tasked with establishing administrative standards, issuing policy statements, and monitoring implementation.
Regarding national security protocols, Mrs Usara added that while NAHCON maintains security agencies as affiliates to assist the matrix, the primary curation of manifests remains decentralised at the state operational level.
This dynamic exposes a critical operational divide. While border immigration personnel at the airport verify identity at the point of international travel and federal regulators monitor compliance with standards, the active vetting of individual backgrounds rests with the state-level frameworks that initially compile the lists. Many states, however, lack the capacity for such vetting, as Nigeria currently operates a unitary security system in which virtually all security agencies are owned and controlled by the federal government.
To understand how the seven suspects passed through these early administrative stages, PREMIUM TIMES visited the Katsina headquarters of the State Pilgrims Welfare Board to obtain an official explanation of the administrative safeguards and background checks built into the pilgrim recruitment process. The board declined to provide details of the process.
During the visit, the Executive Director of the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board, Yunusa Dankama, declined to discuss the registration workflow or to explain what protocols exist for cross-referencing applicant lists with national security watchlists.
The official maintained that details regarding the processing of the state’s Hajj delegation are classified information that cannot be disclosed to the public or the press, asserting that such operational transparency is reserved solely for registered, intending pilgrims. He said that the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board is strictly a logistical and administrative body, not a security agency.
This refusal to disclose the screening workflow leaves a gap in the public’s understanding of the administrative processes. While border security personnel at the airport mapped out their point-of-exit responsibilities, the state institution responsible for processing the applicants, compiling the delegation register, and authorising the final flight manifests declined to explain how its screening safeguards operate before pilgrims reach the tarmac.
One question investigators may still need to answer is whether any local documentation, including letters or clearances issued under regional community peace and amnesty initiatives, formed part of the application process for persons later described by federal authorities as security suspects.
The Outbound Trajectory: Why suspects were not intercepted at departure
The physical operation that culminated in the isolation of the seven suspects at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport unfolded in a matter of minutes during routine arrival clearance. However, the far more significant question confronting investigators and security analysts is why the same security architecture that successfully intercepted the men upon their return permitted them to board their outbound flight weeks earlier.
PREMIUM TIMES sought to resolve this timeline paradox by interviewing border officials and those involved in policy-making and implementation.
According to an immigration officer privy to the airport operation, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak on the matter, the suspects were not intercepted at the point of departure because the active intelligence process managed from Abuja had not yet reached the legal and operational stage where a physical border interception could be authorised.
The source stated that the investigation was still active during the outbound journey, but before the return flight landed, the intelligence process had matured, the facts were firmly established, and a definitive directive was transmitted from Abuja instructing that specific passengers on the incoming aircraft be apprehended immediately upon arrival.
This explanation was corroborated by a senior official at the NIS Headquarters in Abuja, who also provided details off the record.
The official revealed that the suspects’ data profiles had been processed and watchlisted by the NIS Integrated Operations Centre in Abuja before their return. The source indicated that allowing watchlisted individuals to depart can sometimes be part of a calculated tactical surveillance strategy, enabling intelligence agencies to solidify an evidentiary trail or monitor networks while relying on the pilgrimage’s logistical frameworks. Under these operational frameworks, pilgrims are generally scheduled to return through the same airport from which their state delegation departed.
The source, speaking anonymously, stated that the border management platform was fully prepared for their arrival, with the names and biometric profiles circulated to the Katsina Airport Command well before the aircraft entered Nigerian airspace. The source noted that the moment the suspects presented their passports at the arrival clearance desks, the harmonised system triggered an immediate alert, allowing personnel to isolate them quietly without interrupting the clearance of the rest of the flight.
All the officials spoken to confirmed that the seven suspects travelled using valid passports issued under their real names and genuine identities.
However, allowing the terror suspects to travel for Hajj only to arrest them upon their return is a risk. The suspects could have been arrested by Saudi authorities, who in the past have stopped and deported some Nigerian pilgrims despite their clearance by Nigerian authorities. Such a hypothetical arrest by Saudi authorities would have been an embarrassment to Nigeria. Worse is that the suspected terrorists could have chosen to commit acts of terror in Saudi Arabia, which would have significantly damaged Nigeria’s reputation. PREMIUM TIMES tried to put these questions before the SSS, but the agency declined to comment on this report.
While the explanations provided by officials in this report offer an operational account of the timing of the arrests, they leave the broader chronological question unanswered. At what point did the seven suspects first become subjects of security interest to federal intelligence agencies? Was definitive data linking them to insurgent activity available before they applied to join the Katsina State Hajj delegation, or did the information only become available after they left the country?
The physical operation that culminated in the isolation of the seven suspects at the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua International Airport unfolded in a matter of minutes during routine arrival clearance. However, the far more significant question confronting investigators and security analysts is why the same security architecture that successfully intercepted the men upon their return permitted them to board their outbound flight weeks earlier.
PREMIUM TIMES sought to resolve this timeline paradox by interviewing border officials and those involved in policy-making and implementation.
According to an immigration officer privy to the airport operation, who asked not to be named as he was not authorised to speak on the matter, the suspects were not intercepted at the point of departure because the active intelligence process managed from Abuja had not yet reached the legal and operational stage where a physical border interception could be authorised.
The source stated that the investigation was still active during the outbound journey, but before the return flight landed, the intelligence process had matured, the facts were firmly established, and a definitive directive was transmitted from Abuja instructing that specific passengers on the incoming aircraft be apprehended immediately upon arrival.
This explanation was corroborated by a senior official at the NIS Headquarters in Abuja, who also provided details off the record.
The official revealed that the suspects’ data profiles had been processed and watchlisted by the NIS Integrated Operations Centre in Abuja before their return. The source indicated that allowing watchlisted individuals to depart can sometimes be part of a calculated tactical surveillance strategy, enabling intelligence agencies to solidify an evidentiary trail or monitor networks while relying on the pilgrimage’s logistical frameworks. Under these operational frameworks, pilgrims are generally scheduled to return through the same airport from which their state delegation departed.
The source, speaking anonymously, stated that the border management platform was fully prepared for their arrival, with the names and biometric profiles circulated to the Katsina Airport Command well before the aircraft entered Nigerian airspace. The source noted that the moment the suspects presented their passports at the arrival clearance desks, the harmonised system triggered an immediate alert, allowing personnel to isolate them quietly without interrupting the clearance of the rest of the flight.
All the officials spoken to confirmed that the seven suspects travelled using valid passports issued under their real names and genuine identities.
However, allowing the terror suspects to travel for Hajj only to arrest them upon their return is a risk. The suspects could have been arrested by Saudi authorities, who in the past have stopped and deported some Nigerian pilgrims despite their clearance by Nigerian authorities. Such a hypothetical arrest by Saudi authorities would have been an embarrassment to Nigeria. Worse is that the suspected terrorists could have chosen to commit acts of terror in Saudi Arabia, which would have significantly damaged Nigeria’s reputation. PREMIUM TIMES tried to put these questions before the SSS, but the agency declined to comment on this report.
While the explanations provided by officials in this report offer an operational account of the timing of the arrests, they leave the broader chronological question unanswered. At what point did the seven suspects first become subjects of security interest to federal intelligence agencies? Was definitive data linking them to insurgent activity available before they applied to join the Katsina State Hajj delegation, or did the information only become available after they left the country?
Local Accountability: Allegations and state responses
The institutional silence surrounding the pre-departure vetting process has fueled intense public debate in Katsina State over how individuals later described by federal authorities as security suspects could successfully clear local registration channels. In the days following the Minister of Interior’s announcement, several regional commentators and social critics publicly raised questions regarding the source of the suspects’ funding and documentation.
Bashir Kurfi, a prominent local social critic, raised questions about whether individuals recently intercepted at the airport had been beneficiaries of official state-funded Hajj, potentially extended as part of local political amnesty and disarmament packages, to incentivise non-state armed actors to lay down their weapons.
In an official statement issued to the press, the Katsina State Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs described the allegations as entirely baseless and devoid of any factual basis. The Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Nasir Mu’azu, added that the claims were politically motivated to undermine the state’s security operations and collaborations with federal forces. The ministry warned that the state government would not hesitate to pursue legal remedies against persons spreading defamatory misinformation.
PREMIUM TIMES found no evidence from the government’s public statements or from officials interviewed during this investigation that the seven detainees were beneficiaries of state-sponsored Hajj. Hajj pilgrims in Nigeria generally fall into three categories: self-funded, funded by a wealthy person, or state-funded.
Beyond the funding allegations, regional civil society organisations argue that the incident has raised questions about whether existing administrative safeguards are adequate to protect the grassroots layer of the pilgrimage administration. Abdulrahman Abdullahi, chairman of the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Katsina State, emphasised that the prolonged nature of Hajj logistics makes the lack of pre-departure detection a major public concern.
“An international pilgrimage is not an impromptu journey where a traveller walks into a commercial motor park and boards a vehicle,” Mr Abdulrahaman told PREMIUM TIMES. “The processing of fares, the enrollment of passports, the completion of local documentation, and the mandatory orientation exercises take several weeks or months. If individuals later officially labelled as security suspects completed all those stages before travelling, then it is important to understand what happened during that period. Security arrangements need to be proactive, not reactive.”
A similar institutional critique was articulated by Jamilu Charanchi, the national coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG). Mr Charanchi argued that the incident exposes the need for an independent review of the screening architecture surrounding official pilgrimages.
“If individuals suspected of serious involvement in terrorism can seamlessly utilise our official state pilgrimage pipelines to exit and re-enter the country unhindered, the current screening system demands deep scrutiny,” Mr Charanchi told PREMIUM TIMES. “Both the federal government, the state authorities, and the security leadership must constitute an independent investigative committee involving security agencies and relevant Hajj authorities to identify possible gaps in the screening process and strengthen future pilgrim vetting.”
The institutional silence surrounding the pre-departure vetting process has fueled intense public debate in Katsina State over how individuals later described by federal authorities as security suspects could successfully clear local registration channels. In the days following the Minister of Interior’s announcement, several regional commentators and social critics publicly raised questions regarding the source of the suspects’ funding and documentation.
Bashir Kurfi, a prominent local social critic, raised questions about whether individuals recently intercepted at the airport had been beneficiaries of official state-funded Hajj, potentially extended as part of local political amnesty and disarmament packages, to incentivise non-state armed actors to lay down their weapons.
In an official statement issued to the press, the Katsina State Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs described the allegations as entirely baseless and devoid of any factual basis. The Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Nasir Mu’azu, added that the claims were politically motivated to undermine the state’s security operations and collaborations with federal forces. The ministry warned that the state government would not hesitate to pursue legal remedies against persons spreading defamatory misinformation.
PREMIUM TIMES found no evidence from the government’s public statements or from officials interviewed during this investigation that the seven detainees were beneficiaries of state-sponsored Hajj. Hajj pilgrims in Nigeria generally fall into three categories: self-funded, funded by a wealthy person, or state-funded.
Beyond the funding allegations, regional civil society organisations argue that the incident has raised questions about whether existing administrative safeguards are adequate to protect the grassroots layer of the pilgrimage administration. Abdulrahman Abdullahi, chairman of the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Katsina State, emphasised that the prolonged nature of Hajj logistics makes the lack of pre-departure detection a major public concern.
“An international pilgrimage is not an impromptu journey where a traveller walks into a commercial motor park and boards a vehicle,” Mr Abdulrahaman told PREMIUM TIMES. “The processing of fares, the enrollment of passports, the completion of local documentation, and the mandatory orientation exercises take several weeks or months. If individuals later officially labelled as security suspects completed all those stages before travelling, then it is important to understand what happened during that period. Security arrangements need to be proactive, not reactive.”
A similar institutional critique was articulated by Jamilu Charanchi, the national coordinator of the Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG). Mr Charanchi argued that the incident exposes the need for an independent review of the screening architecture surrounding official pilgrimages.
“If individuals suspected of serious involvement in terrorism can seamlessly utilise our official state pilgrimage pipelines to exit and re-enter the country unhindered, the current screening system demands deep scrutiny,” Mr Charanchi told PREMIUM TIMES. “Both the federal government, the state authorities, and the security leadership must constitute an independent investigative committee involving security agencies and relevant Hajj authorities to identify possible gaps in the screening process and strengthen future pilgrim vetting.”
Previous Security Arrests Linked to Pilgrimage
The Katsina operation is not the first time Nigerian security agencies have arrested high-profile security suspects in connection with religious pilgrimage.
In May 2025, SSS operatives arrested two wanted kidnap suspects during pre-departure Hajj screening. They included Yahaya Yakubu, arrested at the Abuja Hajj camp, and Sani Galadi, popularly known as Mai Boxer, who was arrested at the Sokoto Hajj camp before departing for Saudi Arabia.
Earlier, in September 2022, Tukur Mamu, who later faced terrorism-related charges, was intercepted in Cairo while travelling for Umrah before being returned to Nigeria and taken into DSS custody.
The Katsina case differs from these earlier incidents because the suspects were intercepted after completing the Hajj and returning to Nigeria. Their arrest was also publicly presented by the federal government as an example of the efficiency of Nigeria’s integrated biometric border management system.
The Katsina operation is not the first time Nigerian security agencies have arrested high-profile security suspects in connection with religious pilgrimage.
In May 2025, SSS operatives arrested two wanted kidnap suspects during pre-departure Hajj screening. They included Yahaya Yakubu, arrested at the Abuja Hajj camp, and Sani Galadi, popularly known as Mai Boxer, who was arrested at the Sokoto Hajj camp before departing for Saudi Arabia.
Earlier, in September 2022, Tukur Mamu, who later faced terrorism-related charges, was intercepted in Cairo while travelling for Umrah before being returned to Nigeria and taken into DSS custody.
The Katsina case differs from these earlier incidents because the suspects were intercepted after completing the Hajj and returning to Nigeria. Their arrest was also publicly presented by the federal government as an example of the efficiency of Nigeria’s integrated biometric border management system.
Transparency inquiries and outstanding responses
To ensure fairness and balance and give every relevant institution a fair opportunity to respond to the findings of this investigation, PREMIUM TIMES sought clarification from the leadership of all primary organisations within the Hajj and security pipelines.
The SSS was contacted to clarify whether the suspects were already under investigation or active surveillance before leaving Nigeria, when they were formally watchlisted, whether they have been charged, and whether investigations are ongoing. However, as of the time of publication, the agency’s spokesperson has not responded to our questions.
Conversely, NAHCON, through its spokesperson, Mrs Usara, clarified that it operates strictly as an administrative manager and regulator, stating that it does not conduct background screening or manage passenger manifests directly, as those operations are handled entirely by state-level boards.
Following repeated enquiries by PREMIUM TIMES, the Public Relations Officer of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Akinsola Akinlabi, confirmed that the Service arrested the suspects and handed them over to the requesting agency. He, however, declined to comment on operational details, including pre-departure screening procedures and the wider investigation, saying the matter remains sensitive and under investigation.
Meanwhile, this reporter visited the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board and enquired about grassroots documentation safeguards and the verification of local government area registries, but the executive director stated that the board is an administrative entity and not a security agency.
Finally, the Katsina State Government, via the Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs, issued a statement denying any state sponsorship or funding of the suspects’ travel and labelling all such rumours as politically motivated falsehoods unsupported by evidence.
To ensure fairness and balance and give every relevant institution a fair opportunity to respond to the findings of this investigation, PREMIUM TIMES sought clarification from the leadership of all primary organisations within the Hajj and security pipelines.
The SSS was contacted to clarify whether the suspects were already under investigation or active surveillance before leaving Nigeria, when they were formally watchlisted, whether they have been charged, and whether investigations are ongoing. However, as of the time of publication, the agency’s spokesperson has not responded to our questions.
Conversely, NAHCON, through its spokesperson, Mrs Usara, clarified that it operates strictly as an administrative manager and regulator, stating that it does not conduct background screening or manage passenger manifests directly, as those operations are handled entirely by state-level boards.
Following repeated enquiries by PREMIUM TIMES, the Public Relations Officer of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Akinsola Akinlabi, confirmed that the Service arrested the suspects and handed them over to the requesting agency. He, however, declined to comment on operational details, including pre-departure screening procedures and the wider investigation, saying the matter remains sensitive and under investigation.
Meanwhile, this reporter visited the Katsina State Pilgrims Welfare Board and enquired about grassroots documentation safeguards and the verification of local government area registries, but the executive director stated that the board is an administrative entity and not a security agency.
Finally, the Katsina State Government, via the Ministry of Internal Security and Home Affairs, issued a statement denying any state sponsorship or funding of the suspects’ travel and labelling all such rumours as politically motivated falsehoods unsupported by evidence.
Conclusion
As the seven suspects remain in federal custody and investigations continue, the central questions raised by the Katsina operation remain unresolved. The arrests demonstrated that Nigeria’s border security system can identify watchlisted travellers at the point of arrival.
What remains unclear is whether the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims had access to information that could have prevented the journey in the first place. Until those questions are answered, the case will continue to test not only Nigeria’s counterterrorism architecture but also the accountability of the agencies responsible for the country’s largest annual international migration.
As the seven suspects remain in federal custody and investigations continue, the central questions raised by the Katsina operation remain unresolved. The arrests demonstrated that Nigeria’s border security system can identify watchlisted travellers at the point of arrival.
What remains unclear is whether the institutions responsible for processing intending pilgrims had access to information that could have prevented the journey in the first place. Until those questions are answered, the case will continue to test not only Nigeria’s counterterrorism architecture but also the accountability of the agencies responsible for the country’s largest annual international migration.
By Ogalah Dunamis, Premium Times
Pastor’s Wife and 3 Children kidnapped
Islamic terrorists, suspected to be Boko Haram or the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), abducted the wife of a pastor and their three children on Saturday, July 18, along the Maiduguri-Damasak highway in Northeast Nigeria.
The family of Pastor Moses Guguma was on its way to join him in Damasak when the gunmen stopped their vehicle.
Damasak lies in northern Borno state near the Lake Chad basin, about 100 miles from Maiduguri, the state capital. The surrounding region has experienced repeated attacks, kidnappings and displacement during Nigeria’s long-running conflict with Boko Haram and its splinter factions.
The pastor’s family was traveling in a commercial vehicle from Maiduguri to Damasak, where Pastor Guguma leads the congregation of the Church of Christ in All Nations (COCIN). The vehicle was stopped in the afternoon near a military checkpoint in Kareto village in Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno state.
“The gunmen ordered the pastor’s wife and her children to leave the vehicle but permitted the driver and other passengers to continue their journey because they are all Muslims,” an eyewitness told International Christian Concern (ICC). “They took the pastor’s wife and her three children to the bush, but the Nigerian army could do nothing. He said the place is close to a Nigerian Army checkpoint.”
Pastor Guguma said the trip was expected to reunite the family after days of medical treatment in the hospital. The pastor asked the public to pray for the return of his wife and children.
“My wife was sick,” the pastor said. “She just recovered, and she was discharged from the hospital, coming to my station to see me and continued the ministry. Pray for us. My wife is still recovering from the illness.”
Church members said the pastor’s wife and children were abducted because of their faith. They added that the extremists often ask for a large ransom payment or they kill anyone they’ve captured who refuses to convert to Islam. At the time of this post, no ransom has been demanded.
Boko Haram is a Nigeria-based Islamist terrorist organization formally known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad. The group seeks to overthrow Nigeria’s secular government and establish a system governed by its interpretation of Islamic law.
The United States designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2013. The group has attacked churches, Christian communities, schools, government institutions, security forces, and Muslims whom it considers opposed to its ideology. Boko Haram was also responsible for the April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno.
ISWAP traces its origin to Boko Haram’s 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State group. It later developed into a separate faction operating primarily in northeastern Nigeria and across the Lake Chad region, including areas bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
The United States designated ISWAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization in February 2018. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, the organization uses kidnappings, targeted killings, roadside bombs, armed assaults and hostage-taking. Its targets have included Christians, aid workers, government personnel, military forces and civilians who resist its interpretation of Islamic law.
Both Boko Haram and ISWAP are therefore internationally recognized terrorist organizations. Their violence has affected Christians, Muslims and other civilians across northeastern Nigeria, although Christian ministers, churches and families have repeatedly been selected for abduction or execution.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that Boko Haram and ISWAP continued to impose extremist religious beliefs in areas where they operate and remained responsible for serious violations against religious communities. The commission also recorded continuing abductions of pastors, worshippers, women, and children across Nigeria.
Pastor Guguma and his congregation in Damasak are praying for the return of his wife and children.
The family of Pastor Moses Guguma was on its way to join him in Damasak when the gunmen stopped their vehicle.
Damasak lies in northern Borno state near the Lake Chad basin, about 100 miles from Maiduguri, the state capital. The surrounding region has experienced repeated attacks, kidnappings and displacement during Nigeria’s long-running conflict with Boko Haram and its splinter factions.
The pastor’s family was traveling in a commercial vehicle from Maiduguri to Damasak, where Pastor Guguma leads the congregation of the Church of Christ in All Nations (COCIN). The vehicle was stopped in the afternoon near a military checkpoint in Kareto village in Mobbar Local Government Area of Borno state.
“The gunmen ordered the pastor’s wife and her children to leave the vehicle but permitted the driver and other passengers to continue their journey because they are all Muslims,” an eyewitness told International Christian Concern (ICC). “They took the pastor’s wife and her three children to the bush, but the Nigerian army could do nothing. He said the place is close to a Nigerian Army checkpoint.”
Pastor Guguma said the trip was expected to reunite the family after days of medical treatment in the hospital. The pastor asked the public to pray for the return of his wife and children.
“My wife was sick,” the pastor said. “She just recovered, and she was discharged from the hospital, coming to my station to see me and continued the ministry. Pray for us. My wife is still recovering from the illness.”
Church members said the pastor’s wife and children were abducted because of their faith. They added that the extremists often ask for a large ransom payment or they kill anyone they’ve captured who refuses to convert to Islam. At the time of this post, no ransom has been demanded.
Boko Haram is a Nigeria-based Islamist terrorist organization formally known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad. The group seeks to overthrow Nigeria’s secular government and establish a system governed by its interpretation of Islamic law.
The United States designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2013. The group has attacked churches, Christian communities, schools, government institutions, security forces, and Muslims whom it considers opposed to its ideology. Boko Haram was also responsible for the April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno.
ISWAP traces its origin to Boko Haram’s 2015 pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State group. It later developed into a separate faction operating primarily in northeastern Nigeria and across the Lake Chad region, including areas bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger.
The United States designated ISWAP a Foreign Terrorist Organization in February 2018. According to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, the organization uses kidnappings, targeted killings, roadside bombs, armed assaults and hostage-taking. Its targets have included Christians, aid workers, government personnel, military forces and civilians who resist its interpretation of Islamic law.
Both Boko Haram and ISWAP are therefore internationally recognized terrorist organizations. Their violence has affected Christians, Muslims and other civilians across northeastern Nigeria, although Christian ministers, churches and families have repeatedly been selected for abduction or execution.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that Boko Haram and ISWAP continued to impose extremist religious beliefs in areas where they operate and remained responsible for serious violations against religious communities. The commission also recorded continuing abductions of pastors, worshippers, women, and children across Nigeria.
Pastor Guguma and his congregation in Damasak are praying for the return of his wife and children.
Boko Haram Trials Ineffective, Flawed
The Nigerian authorities’ prosecution of Boko Haram suspects does not advance justice for serious international crimes, as the cases continue to target primarily low-level suspects and raise significant fair trial concerns, Human Rights Watch said today.
On April 8, 2026, the Nigerian authorities began the ninth phase of terrorism trials involving more than 500 defendants. The tenth phase began on June 15 with about 600 defendants. Lower-level suspects accused of offenses related to providing material support to armed groups, such as Boko Haram, dominate the court’s docket, while prosecution of those most responsible for serious international crimes are not being prioritized. The judicial proceedings also appear to be based on evidence insufficient to justify criminal convictions. Human Rights Watch raised similar concerns in 2018.
“Nigerian authorities should hold those responsible for atrocities by Boko Haram and security forces to account, but they repeatedly prosecute people with tenuous connections to the most serious crimes in trials that don’t deliver justice,” said Anietie Ewang, Nigeria researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Prosecutions should target higher level offenders and meet fair trial standards to ensure accountability for atrocities by both sides.”
The recent phases of the trials were held at the Federal High Court in Abuja from April 8 to 11 and June 15 to 18, with 10 judges hearing cases simultaneously in separate courtrooms. Human Rights Watch observed proceedings in five of these courtrooms on April 9 and 10 and June 17 and 18, monitored reporting on the trials, and interviewed a government official involved in the proceedings. Human Rights Watch also wrote to relevant government institutions involved in the trials, including the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, seeking responses to questions and concerns about the trials. The Legal Aid Council of Nigeria and the director of public prosecution, on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Justice, have responded.
In its response to Human Rights Watch, the director of public prosecutions said that Nigeria's approach to prosecutions aims to balance the need to confront “terrorism” with the imperative to “preserve the constitutional rights of every person before the courts.” The response went on to emphasize that the office aims to prosecute support networks—including financing, logistics, recruitment, and material support—as part of what it calls “an internationally recognized strategy for disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations.” The Legal Aid Council stated that it was dissatisfied with the convictions and sentences imposed by the courts in some cases during the ninth phase, and had appealed those decisions.
According to media reports, during the 4 days of trial hearings in April, the judges found 386 defendants guilty of terrorism-related crimes, including participation in Boko Haram attacks on civilians, and ordered sentences ranging from 5 years to life in prison. The judges discharged eight defendants in cases in which the director of public prosecutions, in his response, indicated that continuing the prosecutions would not serve the interests of justice and acquitted two others. The court adjourned 112 other cases until June.
During the June proceedings, the court heard cases involving 490 defendants on the first day and an additional 84 on the second day, according to media reports.
Twenty-five of the cases that Human Rights Watch observed were linked to Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Human Rights Watch also observed 10 cases involving the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist movement in southeast Nigeria, and 2 other cases involving banditry-related offenses. Criminal groups commonly referred to as “bandits” operate mainly in the northwest and north central regions of Nigeria.
In 2017 and 2021, the Nigerian government issued terrorism proscription orders designating the activities of IPOB as “bandits” and “terrorism,” specifying that “any person … participating in any manner whatsoever in any form of activities involving or concerning … the [designated] groups … will be violating the provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act … and liable to prosecution.”
In all cases Human Rights Watch observed, prosecutors did not present witnesses or circumstantial evidence to substantiate the alleged charges, which were in some cases ambiguous and lacking crucial information like the specific date and details of the alleged offense.
The director of public prosecutions, in his response, stated that a range of evidence is considered—including witness testimony, electronic and forensic evidence, military operational reports, financial records, documentary exhibits, and expert evidence—before terrorism charges are filed. However, none of these forms of evidence were presented in the cases Human Rights Watch observed, in which convictions were all based on defendants’ guilty pleas, with only confessional statements and investigation reports provided in some cases as supporting evidence.
Judges based the convictions primarily on guilty pleas with alleged confession statements, and investigation reports tendered by the prosecutors as supporting evidence in some cases. When defendants entered not guilty pleas, the prosecution was unable to substantiate the alleged charges and withdrew them. These charges were then struck without being tested in court, even in cases potentially including attacks resulting in civilian deaths.
The prosecution only proceeded with charges to which defendants pleaded guilty, typically related to providing material support to a designated “terrorist” group or failure to report information about members of the group or their activities to security forces. This pattern raises serious concerns about the credibility of these charges and whether Nigerian prosecutors had sufficient evidence to justify bringing or sustaining them in court.
Many defendants had already spent years in pretrial detention, some since 2016, which may amount to arbitrary detention, while some were arrested as recently as 2025.
Under Section 13 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalizes material or nonviolent support to terrorist groups, individuals face penalties of up to 20 years in prison. While Section 13 provides a legal basis for prosecution, its broad framing risks sweeping in individuals whose involvement may have been indirect or coerced, particularly those in conflict-affected areas.
Coupled with the serious fair trial concerns observed, including weak evidentiary basis for the criminal charges and concerns about the ability of defendants to mount an effective defense, these sentencing outcomes raise significant concerns about due process and the proportionality of harsh sentences for minor or tendentious allegations of material support, including when those actions may have been carried out under duress, Human Rights Watch said.
In some cases, defendants and their lawyers presented mitigation statements, including fear of harm to themselves or their families, or inability to report to authorities due to lack of access or security constraints. While these factors led to lesser sentences in some cases, they did not do so in others.
In December 2020, the former International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced the completion of her office’s preliminary examination into the situation in Nigeria, during which it assessed whether it would open a formal investigation. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that members of Boko Haram and its splinter groups, as well as members of the Nigerian security forces, had committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in the context of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria since June 2011. However, at the time, the prosecutor decided not to request the judges’ authorization to open an investigation into the situation in Nigeria, including due to resource constraints.
As a court of last resort, the ICC only steps in when national courts are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. In the years that followed, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor sought to constructively engage with the Nigerian authorities to ensure they delivered on their legal obligation to bring justice with respect to alleged international crimes in the country.
On March 26, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian government deferring to Nigeria’s primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute alleged serious international crimes before its domestic judicial system. The memorandum also stipulates the prosecutor’s office’s commitment to provide support to Nigerian authorities, including through continued encouragement and technical and strategy-related assistance.
Despite these commitments, the current domestic trials have yet to demonstrate the authorities’ genuine willingness and ability to address the pervasive impunity gap in the country, including for serious international crimes committed by the Nigerian security forces, as the focus of the proceedings so far has primarily been on Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other non-state actors.
The OTP should use its unique leverage and the commitments made under the memorandum to press Nigerian authorities to implement the necessary reforms in law and in practice to ensure the genuine investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes committed by all parties, Human Rights Watch said.
Nigerian authorities should ensure that all terrorism trials comply with international fair trial and due process standards, including basing prosecutions on credible and sufficient evidence, and guaranteeing adequate time and appropriate facilities to prepare a defense. They should amend the Terrorism (Prevention) Act to narrow the scope of material support offenses, and ensure that people who acted under coercion or duress are not prosecuted or punished for providing support to armed groups. The amendments should further ensure that people who are unable to report terrorist activity safely, lack meaningful involvement in such activity, or are otherwise in vulnerable or coercive circumstances are not subject to disproportionate penalties for failing to report. The authorities should also establish a process to review and commute sentences imposed on people convicted despite acting under coercion.
“More than eight years after these trials began, recent proceedings continue to reflect substantive and procedural failures,” Ewang said. “If the Nigerian authorities are serious about delivering real justice, they should address these shortcomings, prioritize credible investigations into serious international crimes, and produce robust evidence that can withstand judicial review in fair and credible trials.”
On April 8, 2026, the Nigerian authorities began the ninth phase of terrorism trials involving more than 500 defendants. The tenth phase began on June 15 with about 600 defendants. Lower-level suspects accused of offenses related to providing material support to armed groups, such as Boko Haram, dominate the court’s docket, while prosecution of those most responsible for serious international crimes are not being prioritized. The judicial proceedings also appear to be based on evidence insufficient to justify criminal convictions. Human Rights Watch raised similar concerns in 2018.
“Nigerian authorities should hold those responsible for atrocities by Boko Haram and security forces to account, but they repeatedly prosecute people with tenuous connections to the most serious crimes in trials that don’t deliver justice,” said Anietie Ewang, Nigeria researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Prosecutions should target higher level offenders and meet fair trial standards to ensure accountability for atrocities by both sides.”
The recent phases of the trials were held at the Federal High Court in Abuja from April 8 to 11 and June 15 to 18, with 10 judges hearing cases simultaneously in separate courtrooms. Human Rights Watch observed proceedings in five of these courtrooms on April 9 and 10 and June 17 and 18, monitored reporting on the trials, and interviewed a government official involved in the proceedings. Human Rights Watch also wrote to relevant government institutions involved in the trials, including the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, seeking responses to questions and concerns about the trials. The Legal Aid Council of Nigeria and the director of public prosecution, on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Justice, have responded.
In its response to Human Rights Watch, the director of public prosecutions said that Nigeria's approach to prosecutions aims to balance the need to confront “terrorism” with the imperative to “preserve the constitutional rights of every person before the courts.” The response went on to emphasize that the office aims to prosecute support networks—including financing, logistics, recruitment, and material support—as part of what it calls “an internationally recognized strategy for disrupting and dismantling terrorist organizations.” The Legal Aid Council stated that it was dissatisfied with the convictions and sentences imposed by the courts in some cases during the ninth phase, and had appealed those decisions.
According to media reports, during the 4 days of trial hearings in April, the judges found 386 defendants guilty of terrorism-related crimes, including participation in Boko Haram attacks on civilians, and ordered sentences ranging from 5 years to life in prison. The judges discharged eight defendants in cases in which the director of public prosecutions, in his response, indicated that continuing the prosecutions would not serve the interests of justice and acquitted two others. The court adjourned 112 other cases until June.
During the June proceedings, the court heard cases involving 490 defendants on the first day and an additional 84 on the second day, according to media reports.
Twenty-five of the cases that Human Rights Watch observed were linked to Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Human Rights Watch also observed 10 cases involving the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a separatist movement in southeast Nigeria, and 2 other cases involving banditry-related offenses. Criminal groups commonly referred to as “bandits” operate mainly in the northwest and north central regions of Nigeria.
In 2017 and 2021, the Nigerian government issued terrorism proscription orders designating the activities of IPOB as “bandits” and “terrorism,” specifying that “any person … participating in any manner whatsoever in any form of activities involving or concerning … the [designated] groups … will be violating the provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act … and liable to prosecution.”
In all cases Human Rights Watch observed, prosecutors did not present witnesses or circumstantial evidence to substantiate the alleged charges, which were in some cases ambiguous and lacking crucial information like the specific date and details of the alleged offense.
The director of public prosecutions, in his response, stated that a range of evidence is considered—including witness testimony, electronic and forensic evidence, military operational reports, financial records, documentary exhibits, and expert evidence—before terrorism charges are filed. However, none of these forms of evidence were presented in the cases Human Rights Watch observed, in which convictions were all based on defendants’ guilty pleas, with only confessional statements and investigation reports provided in some cases as supporting evidence.
Judges based the convictions primarily on guilty pleas with alleged confession statements, and investigation reports tendered by the prosecutors as supporting evidence in some cases. When defendants entered not guilty pleas, the prosecution was unable to substantiate the alleged charges and withdrew them. These charges were then struck without being tested in court, even in cases potentially including attacks resulting in civilian deaths.
The prosecution only proceeded with charges to which defendants pleaded guilty, typically related to providing material support to a designated “terrorist” group or failure to report information about members of the group or their activities to security forces. This pattern raises serious concerns about the credibility of these charges and whether Nigerian prosecutors had sufficient evidence to justify bringing or sustaining them in court.
Many defendants had already spent years in pretrial detention, some since 2016, which may amount to arbitrary detention, while some were arrested as recently as 2025.
Under Section 13 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, which criminalizes material or nonviolent support to terrorist groups, individuals face penalties of up to 20 years in prison. While Section 13 provides a legal basis for prosecution, its broad framing risks sweeping in individuals whose involvement may have been indirect or coerced, particularly those in conflict-affected areas.
Coupled with the serious fair trial concerns observed, including weak evidentiary basis for the criminal charges and concerns about the ability of defendants to mount an effective defense, these sentencing outcomes raise significant concerns about due process and the proportionality of harsh sentences for minor or tendentious allegations of material support, including when those actions may have been carried out under duress, Human Rights Watch said.
In some cases, defendants and their lawyers presented mitigation statements, including fear of harm to themselves or their families, or inability to report to authorities due to lack of access or security constraints. While these factors led to lesser sentences in some cases, they did not do so in others.
In December 2020, the former International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced the completion of her office’s preliminary examination into the situation in Nigeria, during which it assessed whether it would open a formal investigation. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that members of Boko Haram and its splinter groups, as well as members of the Nigerian security forces, had committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in the context of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria since June 2011. However, at the time, the prosecutor decided not to request the judges’ authorization to open an investigation into the situation in Nigeria, including due to resource constraints.
As a court of last resort, the ICC only steps in when national courts are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute serious crimes. In the years that followed, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor sought to constructively engage with the Nigerian authorities to ensure they delivered on their legal obligation to bring justice with respect to alleged international crimes in the country.
On March 26, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Nigerian government deferring to Nigeria’s primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute alleged serious international crimes before its domestic judicial system. The memorandum also stipulates the prosecutor’s office’s commitment to provide support to Nigerian authorities, including through continued encouragement and technical and strategy-related assistance.
Despite these commitments, the current domestic trials have yet to demonstrate the authorities’ genuine willingness and ability to address the pervasive impunity gap in the country, including for serious international crimes committed by the Nigerian security forces, as the focus of the proceedings so far has primarily been on Boko Haram, ISWAP, and other non-state actors.
The OTP should use its unique leverage and the commitments made under the memorandum to press Nigerian authorities to implement the necessary reforms in law and in practice to ensure the genuine investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes committed by all parties, Human Rights Watch said.
Nigerian authorities should ensure that all terrorism trials comply with international fair trial and due process standards, including basing prosecutions on credible and sufficient evidence, and guaranteeing adequate time and appropriate facilities to prepare a defense. They should amend the Terrorism (Prevention) Act to narrow the scope of material support offenses, and ensure that people who acted under coercion or duress are not prosecuted or punished for providing support to armed groups. The amendments should further ensure that people who are unable to report terrorist activity safely, lack meaningful involvement in such activity, or are otherwise in vulnerable or coercive circumstances are not subject to disproportionate penalties for failing to report. The authorities should also establish a process to review and commute sentences imposed on people convicted despite acting under coercion.
“More than eight years after these trials began, recent proceedings continue to reflect substantive and procedural failures,” Ewang said. “If the Nigerian authorities are serious about delivering real justice, they should address these shortcomings, prioritize credible investigations into serious international crimes, and produce robust evidence that can withstand judicial review in fair and credible trials.”
Weak Evidentiary Standards and “Plea-Driven” Convictions
In the cases Human Rights Watch observed that were linked to Boko Haram and ISWAP, Justice Ministry prosecutors brought a range of charges related to association with the groups and their activities. These include membership in one of the groups, failure to report information about members of the group or their activities to security forces, and providing material or nonviolent support to the group.
Alleged material support offenses include paying a religious tax in the form of farm produce or farming; supplying essentials such as gasoline, firewood, rice, corn, seasonings, and other foodstuffs; rearing stolen cattle; purchasing agrochemicals for the group; transporting ammunition; acting as informants; recruiting; kidnapping; and receiving ransom payments. Some of these charges conflate serious allegations of support to proscribed groups with situations in which ordinary people may be coerced into providing resources. This raises serious concerns about whether some of the charges should be brought at all, Human Rights Watch said.
All defendants in the cases Human Rights Watch observed were represented by lawyers from the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, a government-funded agency that provides legal assistance to indigent people. However, in its written response to Human Rights Watch’s questions and concerns, the Legal Aid Council stated that it provided legal representation to the majority of the defendants in line with its mandate to provide pro bono legal services, but noted that a small number of defendants in the trials were represented by private legal practitioners if they could afford to hire a lawyer.
In the trials that Human Rights Watch observed, prosecutors relied on guilty pleas rather than testing evidence through adversarial proceedings. In 26 of the 35 applicable cases, the prosecution asked the judge to strike out all charges to which the defendants had pleaded not guilty and proceeded to seek convictions only on the charges to which the defendants had pleaded guilty.
This pattern persisted even in cases that could include serious international criminal charges, such as attacks against a civilian population resulting in deaths, which could amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These cases raise concerns that prosecutors are either overcharging defendants to coerce them into pleading guilty to lesser offenses or are not making meaningful efforts to secure accountability for the most serious crimes.
In one case, the prosecution brought four charges against the defendant, including participation in a Boko Haram attack in Gwoza, Borno State; participation in an attack in Biu, Yobe State, with civilians allegedly killed in both attacks; membership in Boko Haram; and receiving weapons training to carry out acts of terrorism. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the two charges concerning participation in attacks against civilians which were broadly framed and lacked specific details about the defendant’s alleged conduct or role in the attacks. Following the not guilty pleas, the prosecution applied to withdraw those charges, and the court struck them out. The defendant was subsequently convicted on the remaining two charges to which he had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
In one case in which an innocent plea resulted in charges being dropped, a defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges, including membership in Boko Haram, failure to report named individuals, and supplying goods such as gasoline and soft drinks. The prosecution then asked to adjourn the proceedings without presenting any evidence to challenge the plea. An official involved in the trials told Human Rights Watch that similar adjourned cases in earlier phases had not returned to court.
The proceedings also raised concerns about whether defendants were afforded a genuine opportunity to prepare and present a defense, even though in the proceedings that Human Rights Watch observed, the defense lawyers stated that they had met with the defendants prior to the trial to prepare their cases. The defense lawyers neither called witnesses nor presented evidence. Their role was mostly limited to appearing in court and, after the defendants pleaded guilty and were convicted, making brief statements to the judge asking for leniency before they were sentenced.
In the cases Human Rights Watch observed, defendants who pleaded guilty received prison sentences ranging from 10 to 80 years. Eighteen cases resulted in convictions for material support-related offenses, with sentences ranging from ten to thirty years. The defendant in a case involving 12 charges received several sentences, including 50 years for membership in and recruitment on behalf of Boko Haram, and 80 years for financing terrorism by receiving 50 thousand naira (approximately US$36) to further Boko Haram activities. In all cases, the court ordered to calculate the sentences retroactively from the date of arrest.
In another case, the prosecution brought four charges against the defendant, including membership in ISWAP in Okene, Ekiti State; receiving military training and weapons-handling instruction, including the use of AK-47 rifles; providing support to ISWAP during a 2021 prison break in Ekiti State; and attacking the Nigerian Navy using an AK-47 and other weapons.
The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges except the membership charge. The prosecution subsequently applied to strike out the remaining charges and urged the court to convict the defendant on the count to which he had pleaded guilty. The judge sentenced the defendant to 20 years in prison.
The only two cases observed by Human Rights Watch in which this pattern did not occur involved one charge against each defendant—membership in Boko Haram and concealment of information relating to material support for Boko Haram, respectively—to which the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to 10 years each.
Nigerian authorities operate a deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program known as Operation Safe Corridor for former Boko Haram and ISWAP affiliates classified as “low risk” or “repentant” insurgents. While judges did not specifically reference the program in their sentencing decisions, most of which included orders for deradicalization and rehabilitation before release, media reports indicate that individuals convicted in earlier phases of the trials were later transferred to Operation Safe Corridor for rehabilitation, deradicalization, and reintegration after completing their sentences.
In the cases Human Rights Watch observed that were linked to Boko Haram and ISWAP, Justice Ministry prosecutors brought a range of charges related to association with the groups and their activities. These include membership in one of the groups, failure to report information about members of the group or their activities to security forces, and providing material or nonviolent support to the group.
Alleged material support offenses include paying a religious tax in the form of farm produce or farming; supplying essentials such as gasoline, firewood, rice, corn, seasonings, and other foodstuffs; rearing stolen cattle; purchasing agrochemicals for the group; transporting ammunition; acting as informants; recruiting; kidnapping; and receiving ransom payments. Some of these charges conflate serious allegations of support to proscribed groups with situations in which ordinary people may be coerced into providing resources. This raises serious concerns about whether some of the charges should be brought at all, Human Rights Watch said.
All defendants in the cases Human Rights Watch observed were represented by lawyers from the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, a government-funded agency that provides legal assistance to indigent people. However, in its written response to Human Rights Watch’s questions and concerns, the Legal Aid Council stated that it provided legal representation to the majority of the defendants in line with its mandate to provide pro bono legal services, but noted that a small number of defendants in the trials were represented by private legal practitioners if they could afford to hire a lawyer.
In the trials that Human Rights Watch observed, prosecutors relied on guilty pleas rather than testing evidence through adversarial proceedings. In 26 of the 35 applicable cases, the prosecution asked the judge to strike out all charges to which the defendants had pleaded not guilty and proceeded to seek convictions only on the charges to which the defendants had pleaded guilty.
This pattern persisted even in cases that could include serious international criminal charges, such as attacks against a civilian population resulting in deaths, which could amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. These cases raise concerns that prosecutors are either overcharging defendants to coerce them into pleading guilty to lesser offenses or are not making meaningful efforts to secure accountability for the most serious crimes.
In one case, the prosecution brought four charges against the defendant, including participation in a Boko Haram attack in Gwoza, Borno State; participation in an attack in Biu, Yobe State, with civilians allegedly killed in both attacks; membership in Boko Haram; and receiving weapons training to carry out acts of terrorism. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the two charges concerning participation in attacks against civilians which were broadly framed and lacked specific details about the defendant’s alleged conduct or role in the attacks. Following the not guilty pleas, the prosecution applied to withdraw those charges, and the court struck them out. The defendant was subsequently convicted on the remaining two charges to which he had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 20 years on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.
In one case in which an innocent plea resulted in charges being dropped, a defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges, including membership in Boko Haram, failure to report named individuals, and supplying goods such as gasoline and soft drinks. The prosecution then asked to adjourn the proceedings without presenting any evidence to challenge the plea. An official involved in the trials told Human Rights Watch that similar adjourned cases in earlier phases had not returned to court.
The proceedings also raised concerns about whether defendants were afforded a genuine opportunity to prepare and present a defense, even though in the proceedings that Human Rights Watch observed, the defense lawyers stated that they had met with the defendants prior to the trial to prepare their cases. The defense lawyers neither called witnesses nor presented evidence. Their role was mostly limited to appearing in court and, after the defendants pleaded guilty and were convicted, making brief statements to the judge asking for leniency before they were sentenced.
In the cases Human Rights Watch observed, defendants who pleaded guilty received prison sentences ranging from 10 to 80 years. Eighteen cases resulted in convictions for material support-related offenses, with sentences ranging from ten to thirty years. The defendant in a case involving 12 charges received several sentences, including 50 years for membership in and recruitment on behalf of Boko Haram, and 80 years for financing terrorism by receiving 50 thousand naira (approximately US$36) to further Boko Haram activities. In all cases, the court ordered to calculate the sentences retroactively from the date of arrest.
In another case, the prosecution brought four charges against the defendant, including membership in ISWAP in Okene, Ekiti State; receiving military training and weapons-handling instruction, including the use of AK-47 rifles; providing support to ISWAP during a 2021 prison break in Ekiti State; and attacking the Nigerian Navy using an AK-47 and other weapons.
The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges except the membership charge. The prosecution subsequently applied to strike out the remaining charges and urged the court to convict the defendant on the count to which he had pleaded guilty. The judge sentenced the defendant to 20 years in prison.
The only two cases observed by Human Rights Watch in which this pattern did not occur involved one charge against each defendant—membership in Boko Haram and concealment of information relating to material support for Boko Haram, respectively—to which the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to 10 years each.
Nigerian authorities operate a deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program known as Operation Safe Corridor for former Boko Haram and ISWAP affiliates classified as “low risk” or “repentant” insurgents. While judges did not specifically reference the program in their sentencing decisions, most of which included orders for deradicalization and rehabilitation before release, media reports indicate that individuals convicted in earlier phases of the trials were later transferred to Operation Safe Corridor for rehabilitation, deradicalization, and reintegration after completing their sentences.
Prosecuting ‘Material Support’ Risks Criminalizing Acts of Survival
The broad framing of “material support” offenses under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act risks criminalizing ordinary survival strategies in areas under Boko Haram or ISWAP control. Court proceedings did not appear to distinguish between voluntary collaboration and conduct carried out under coercion or duress, even in cases in which defendants or the defense lawyers indicated that their actions were not voluntary.
In three cases, defendants plead guilty, admitting to carrying out the alleged acts, saying that they had feared harm to themselves or their families, or were unable to report to authorities due to lack of access or security constraints. In 16 other cases, defendants or their lawyers gave these explanations as mitigating factors following guilty pleas and convictions. While these factors appeared to result in reduced sentences in some cases, they did not consistently do so.
This raises concerns about the effectiveness of legal representation, including whether defendants were adequately informed of the legal consequences of entering guilty pleas, and whether they were given sufficient time and opportunity to prepare and present a defense.
In one case, a defendant pleaded guilty to paying a religious tax to Boko Haram. When presenting mitigating statements before the defendant was sentenced, the defense counsel said that the payments were made under duress and because the defendant had no choice. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison on that charge, to run concurrently with another 20-year sentence for failure to disclose information about Boko Haram members to security forces.
In another case, a defendant who had been detained since 2017 pleaded guilty to five charges of failure to disclose information about Boko Haram members, and not guilty to three other charges, including membership in Boko Haram. While pleading for leniency, he said that reporting Boko Haram activities to security officials was not possible because there were no security forces in his community. He was sentenced to 10 years on each count, to run concurrently from the date of his arrest.
One defendant was sentenced to 25 years after pleading guilty to providing material support to Boko Haram by rearing goats for the group. While seeking leniency, the defense counsel said that rearing goats was the defendant’s primary source of livelihood and that he had been forced to work for Boko Haram after the group invaded his village.
The broad framing of “material support” offenses under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act risks criminalizing ordinary survival strategies in areas under Boko Haram or ISWAP control. Court proceedings did not appear to distinguish between voluntary collaboration and conduct carried out under coercion or duress, even in cases in which defendants or the defense lawyers indicated that their actions were not voluntary.
In three cases, defendants plead guilty, admitting to carrying out the alleged acts, saying that they had feared harm to themselves or their families, or were unable to report to authorities due to lack of access or security constraints. In 16 other cases, defendants or their lawyers gave these explanations as mitigating factors following guilty pleas and convictions. While these factors appeared to result in reduced sentences in some cases, they did not consistently do so.
This raises concerns about the effectiveness of legal representation, including whether defendants were adequately informed of the legal consequences of entering guilty pleas, and whether they were given sufficient time and opportunity to prepare and present a defense.
In one case, a defendant pleaded guilty to paying a religious tax to Boko Haram. When presenting mitigating statements before the defendant was sentenced, the defense counsel said that the payments were made under duress and because the defendant had no choice. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in prison on that charge, to run concurrently with another 20-year sentence for failure to disclose information about Boko Haram members to security forces.
In another case, a defendant who had been detained since 2017 pleaded guilty to five charges of failure to disclose information about Boko Haram members, and not guilty to three other charges, including membership in Boko Haram. While pleading for leniency, he said that reporting Boko Haram activities to security officials was not possible because there were no security forces in his community. He was sentenced to 10 years on each count, to run concurrently from the date of his arrest.
One defendant was sentenced to 25 years after pleading guilty to providing material support to Boko Haram by rearing goats for the group. While seeking leniency, the defense counsel said that rearing goats was the defendant’s primary source of livelihood and that he had been forced to work for Boko Haram after the group invaded his village.
Reduced Safeguards in the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2023
The Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2023, which amended and replaced the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, appears to have taken a more punitive approach. While the 2011 Act included a defense for individuals charged with failing to report terrorist activity if they could show they had a reasonable excuse, the 2023 Act removed that protection. It also failed to improve on the 2011 Act's broadly framed material support offenses by introducing an explicit defense for people who acted under coercion or duress, increasing the risk for victims of abuse to be prosecuted alongside those who intentionally assist terrorist groups.
The Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2023, which amended and replaced the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, appears to have taken a more punitive approach. While the 2011 Act included a defense for individuals charged with failing to report terrorist activity if they could show they had a reasonable excuse, the 2023 Act removed that protection. It also failed to improve on the 2011 Act's broadly framed material support offenses by introducing an explicit defense for people who acted under coercion or duress, increasing the risk for victims of abuse to be prosecuted alongside those who intentionally assist terrorist groups.
Tuesday, July 21, 2026
Video - 'We're living in fear': 19 million children in Nigeria are out of school to avoid kidnappings
The 46 children and teachers that were abducted on May 15th in southwestern state of Oyo were rescued and reunited with their families on July 10th. Since the dramatic abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014, Nigeria has been hit with waves of mass kidnappings from schools. 27% of children in Nigeria are out of school, one of the highest rates in the world. The threat of abduction serves as one of the biggest obstacles to children pursuing their education.
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